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INTRODUCTION 
The beginning of this Essay takes an unorthodox course.  As a 
starting point, I jump to the middle of my topic.  I do so by telling a 
story.  Through this approach, borrowing a page from the style of 
children’s stories and biblical text, I seek to simplify my task.  The tale 
I will relate is meant as an expression that sometimes, complex 
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challenges are easier to explain and best understood when clarified 
with plain illustrations.  Graphic contrasts and allegorical aids open 
lines to purpose and meaning.  Casting things in a different light this 
way can serve not only to gain clearer understanding, but to change 
hearts and minds, and perhaps even catalyze sooner action in 
response to a need or a cause. 
The story occurred to me recently while reading a statement made 
by a judge that contains an insightful comparison; one I think sheds 
light on my thesis.  The judge commented on the function of our 
courts as the place to which people must sometimes resort in coping 
with the countless acute afflictions of life, many of which involve 
urgencies they, especially the poor, endure daily as they struggle to 
satisfy basic human needs.  In this connection, the judge said that 
“[t]he courts are truly the emergency rooms of society.”1 
That judicial metaphor is generally apt and should work well as 
applied to most people.  But, now vary the analogy.  Change the 
hospital emergency room by adjusting how it functions to reflect the 
workings of the courthouse, focusing in particular on the realities 
poor unrepresented parties encounter daily in our courts.  What 
would hospital patients experience if some of the treatment and 
practices that poor people face in our justice system applied to 
medical care as well?  The new setting, even with its bizarre 
distortion, is not hard to visualize.  And the picture it would paint is 
not pretty. 
In the emergency room as imagined, two groups of patients—one 
wealthy and one poor—enter presenting similarly serious wounds and 
acute pains.  The rich patients—those able to afford the full expense 
of medical services—are sent to an intensive care unit for treatment 
by certified physicians and trained nurses.  The poor ones—those 
possessing no means from any source to pay for doctors—are shunted 
to a common waiting room.  There they sit for hours until their names 
are called, at which point they are handed a first-aid kit, an 
abbreviated medical manual, and other self-help guides.  The package 
includes forms describing various common conditions by which the 
patients might be able to identify what they feel and compare their 
symptoms to those of known illnesses, and thus self-diagnose what 
ails them.  The kit also provides how-to instructions that the patients 
can follow in operating the image scanning machines; pads on which 
to write prescriptions for their own medications; and even simple 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. Jonathan Lippman, New York’s Template to Address the Crisis in Civil Legal 
Services, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 14 (2013). 
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instruments with which to perform surgical procedures on themselves.  
To handle extreme circumstances in which the poor patients 
encounter exceptional difficulties employing this handy service, the 
hospital maintains on standby duty a limited number of medical 
students and nurse trainees to provide low-income patients some 
basic guidance on the use of the various medical tools supplied to 
them.  Meanwhile, the hospital’s physicians, on the way from their 
lounge to and from serving the paying patients, regularly pass by the 
poor people’s waiting room. 
Would the hospital trustees and administrators maintain a health 
care system featuring the emergency room service this illustration 
depicts?  In our civilization, indisputably not.  Indeed, even in the 
world’s least progressive societies it would be derided as a travesty, a 
mockery not only of health care standards, but of any measure of 
human caring as well.  Yet any judge would readily recognize a 
parallel courthouse caricature.  To a judge watching litigants 
represent themselves in a courtroom, the event often seems like the 
justice system’s version of assisted suicide.  The scene of self-help in 
the courthouse is especially poignant at a trial or in complicated 
proceedings in which the controlling legal issues lodge somewhere 
within the arcana and long-studied subtleties of the law.  The 
experience could be every bit as disturbing and pitiable as it might be 
to witness a hospital patient self-administering surgical aid. 
If this hypothetical sounds too fanciful or far off the mark, think of 
real cases taken from the courts’ dockets every day.  Consider the 
recent crisis in this country’s housing market brought about by 
mortgage foreclosures.  We know now that vast numbers of those 
proceedings were basically flawed, if not recklessly fraudulent or 
otherwise unlawful.  Yet, in New York, in over 60% of the foreclosure 
actions filed by the nation’s largest banks, homeowners were not 
represented at a critical stage of the proceedings that the applicable 
statute requires before a judge can grant relief.2  By contrast, the 
banks appeared in court through specialized lawyers.  Literally tens of 
thousands of those individuals lost their homes improperly, and many 
of them might have avoided that fate had they received adequate 
legal assistance.  How many of those families are now homeless, on 
the streets, in shelters, or sharing overcrowded quarters with relatives 
and friends?  The same situation continues to play out daily in New 
York City Housing Court.  Every year, in hundreds of thousands of 
                                                                                                                                      
 2. See ANN PFAU, STATE OF N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., 2010 REPORT OF THE 
CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS 11–12 (2010), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/publications/pdfs/foreclosurereportnov2010.pdf. 
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eviction actions, over 95% of tenants appear in court as defendants 
without a lawyer.  Landlords represented by counsel confront these 
tenants in almost all cases.3 Massive numbers of those poor tenants 
end up homeless and cite eviction as the cause, while eviction ensues 
in few of the cases in which they are assisted by a lawyer.4 
Applying my own comparative scoring of the physical and 
emotional pain levels people experience in a hospital and a 
courthouse on a scale of one to ten, I would say that in many 
circumstances the hurt ratings would at minimum coincide.  For a 
resident evicted from a home and thrown out onto the streets, for a 
parent who loses custody of a child, for an elderly person who forfeits 
health benefits or financial assistance—in each of these cases by lack 
of legal aid in court proceedings instituted to curtail rights to basic 
human needs—the outcome could feel as excruciating, and pierce as 
deeply into the sinew and bone of daily life, as wounds inflicted by 
bodily injury.  The emotional distress and psychological aches these 
unassisted parties suffer in the courthouse may be no less acute and 
traumatic than the pain associated with many physical ailments for 
which they can secure routine medical treatment in the emergency 
room. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The hospital analogy in my Introduction can be brought closer to 
home in court, as I will try to do later in my presentation through 
another fable.  For now, let us return to actual developments in the 
real world of legal services for the poor.  Earlier this year a spate of 
articles appeared in the news media and in academic literature 
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright.5  
Much of the commentary focused on assessing whether the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling in that case has achieved its full promise: the 
constitutional right of indigents to representation of counsel in 
criminal proceedings.6  Over time, the circumstances that compelled 
                                                                                                                                      
 3. See generally COMM. ON LEGAL ASSISTANCE, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY 
OF N.Y., HOUSING COURT PRO BONO PROJECT: REPORT ON THE PROJECT, PARTS I 
AND II (1988); THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., 
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2010), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/access-civil-legal-services/PDF/CLS-
TaskForceREPORT.pdf (noting that 99% of tenants are unrepresented in eviction 
cases in New York City). 
 4. See COMM. ON LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 11–13. 
 5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 6. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, The Right to Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/the-right-to-
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Gideon—the denial of equal access to justice in our courts based on a 
person’s inability to pay—has prompted examination of the same 
fundamental issues as they relate to the civil justice system.  Perhaps 
the most prominent question in this debate is whether the time has 
come for what is referred to as a “civil Gideon,” and how the courts 
and members of the Bar should gear up to address both the 
overwhelming need and the growing demand for legal services for 
low-income persons in civil cases in view of the limited available 
resources. 
During the past twenty-five years, as this retrospective will 
demonstrate, the New York State court system has been recognized 
as a pioneer in addressing these issues.  Working closely with New 
York’s organized Bar, our State judicial officers and administrators 
have led the way in calling attention to the legal needs of the poor, in 
advocating for improvements in programs devoted to meeting those 
needs, and in highlighting the public benefits and personal value that 
lawyers, litigants, and the courts derive from pro bono and public 
interest legal service.  This Essay examines what New York has and 
has not done in this sphere over this time span, the extent to which 
the State’s efforts have and have not succeeded, and what more may 
need to be done to realize better results.  My thesis stresses a vital 
point: the severe crisis that large numbers of unrepresented poor 
people creates for our civil justice system, as well as for our larger 
society, raises not only grave legal and administrative concerns, but 
profoundly moral predicaments. 
As an opening historical backdrop, I quote from statements made 
by two New York State Chief Judges.  In the spring of 1988, then 
Chief Judge Sol Wachtler noted that “the growing need for providing 
legal services to the poor has worsened.”7  He added that “[t]here has 
been a disproportionate growth in the number of lawyers engaged in 
the practice of law in relation to the number of people who are denied 
effective access to the civil justice system in this state because of a 
lack of means.”8  In early 2013, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman made 
                                                                                                                                      
counsel-badly-battered-at-50.html?_r=0; Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the 
Right to Counsel, 50 Years After ‘Gideon’, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013, 11:09 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-
counsel-50-years-after-gideon/273433/?single_page=true; Karen Houppert, Indigent 
Clients Suffer as Public Defenders Struggle to Keep Up with Caseloads, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/legal-aid-for-indigent-
clients-needs-help/2013/03/15/65dcbe56-8cc9-11e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4_story.html. 
 7. Victor Marrero et al., Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal 
Services, Final Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 19 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 755, app. A at 852 (1990). 
 8. Id. at 763 (internal citation omitted). 
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a similar observation.  He wrote that “we are facing a crisis in the 
delivery of justice in New York State . . . . There is a growing justice 
gap between the dire need for civil legal services and the dwindling 
resources available.”9 
These comments were given twenty-five years apart by two New 
York State Chief Judges, noting the existence of essentially the same 
conditions challenging our civil justice system.  In light of these 
comments, when I was considering a subtitle for this Essay the first 
idea that came to mind was “The More Things Change, The More 
They Stay The Same.”  Instead, I labeled it “The Silent Majority” for 
reasons that will become clear in a moment.  As a starting point, I 
perceive that during this past quarter of a century, through the efforts 
undertaken by courts and the organized Bar to expand legal services 
available for civil litigants unable to afford counsel, some things 
indeed have changed substantially.  But others have remained at a 
standstill, relatively unaffected despite the considerable public and 
private energies and resources that have been expended to improve 
access to the civil justice system. 
To preface this part of my remarks, I acknowledge something that 
has stayed the same over these years.  This constant is embodied in 
the remarkable leadership provided by three successive New York 
State Chief Judges—Sol Wachtler, Judith Kaye, and Jonathan 
Lippman—regarding the underlying access to justice issues.  Each of 
them has played an exceptional role in focusing the Bar’s attention on 
what is referred to as the “justice gap,”10 a phenomenon also often 
characterized as a “crisis” in civil justice in New York,11 and indeed in 
many other parts of the country.12  Those terms encompass two 
interrelated challenges.  The first expresses a matter of quantity: the 
vast number of civil litigants who appear in court proceedings every 
day without assistance of counsel because they cannot afford to pay 
for a lawyer.  The second conveys a question of quality; there are 
adverse consequences that unrepresented poor litigants in such 
magnitude impose on the parties, the courts, the legal profession, and 
the larger society.  Each of these Chief Judges deserves recognition 
and our gratitude for exercising the great authority and moral 
                                                                                                                                      
 9. Lippman, supra note 1, at 13. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id.; see also THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. 
IN N.Y., supra note 3, at 1; Marrero et al., supra note 7, at 772. 
 12. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., REPORT OF THE PRO BONO TASK FORCE 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/lscgov4/PBTF_%20Report_ 
FINAL.pdf. 
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leadership of their high office to promote the public good, not only by 
raising awareness of the existence of a large blight on our justice 
system, but also by initiating creative ways to mitigate its harms.  In 
this ample tribute to judicial action I report the good news.  I now 
turn to chronicle the not so good—the reaction and inaction. 
II.  LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 
Regrettably, despite the commitment and best efforts of our Chief 
Judges and courts, even combined with strong cooperation and 
support from major segments of the organized Bar, the justice gap 
persists in New York, its effects still as pernicious as ever.  But while 
the dimensions of the crisis have remained essentially the same in 
some respects, in other ways they have gotten worse, significantly 
altering the tenor and enlarging the implications of the underlying 
problems for our justice system.  A hard look at the twenty-five years 
of experience examined here confirms this observation.  For 
regardless of the many remedial efforts attempted by judges and the 
organized Bar, the acute legal crisis engendered in our courts by the 
overwhelming number of unrepresented poor litigants has festered.  
As the hardships that low-income people encounter in our courts by 
denial of effective access to justice have deepened, resulting legal and 
social issues have assumed a higher grade of urgency. 
Fifty-one years ago, President John F. Kennedy spoke to the nation 
in a speech which still has resonance for the issues I present.13  He 
addressed the inequality of treatment in civil rights African 
Americans experienced under long-standing legal norms and social 
practices that had developed in this country, conditions that had 
become entrenched and intractable because they had been actively 
observed and enforced, or condoned or ignored by many generations 
of Americans.14  On this point, he described how on account of the 
consequential injustices, the problem had intensified so as to decay 
into what he characterized as a “moral crisis.”15  Those grave 
injustices, which for centuries had been encoded or tolerated by much 
of American society and still engraved in our collective conscience, 
are now a thing of the past.  They fell because our nation could no 
longer accommodate a moral contradiction.  The societal, moral, and 
legal system that fostered those injustices eventually collapsed for the 
                                                                                                                                      
 13. See generally John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Radio and 
Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), available 
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9271. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. 
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same reason that one hundred years earlier, as Abraham Lincoln had 
foretold, the United States could not stand as a house divided against 
itself.  At neither of those historical crossroads could America live 
with the discrepancy between what its people loftily professed on 
paper and what they actually did on the ground, between the high 
principles of human equality and equal justice our Constitution 
proclaims as supreme law of the land, and an oppressive reality: the 
virulent discrimination and rampant violence that a major part of the 
American population endured because of the happenstance of race. 
In a similar vein, a moral crisis, unsustainable under the weight of 
equally powerful principles, permeates our civil justice system.  The 
grave imbalance of legal resources the poor contend with in civil 
actions has deepened into crisis conditions that, in moral terms, we 
should regard as ugly and unconscionable, and combat as vigorously 
as those that defined and weakened this country during the centuries-
long struggle of African Americans for equal rights.  For, at bottom, 
as was the case of the injustices prevailing in American society 
generations ago, perhaps the worst outcome that the crisis of inequity 
of civil justice presents to our generation is its constitutional 
dimension.  As a by-product of the enormous burdens the legal 
services needs of unrepresented parties impose on our judicial system, 
courts have become increasingly two-tiered.  In essence, the price of 
services in our judicial system has been marked up, and the caliber of 
justice it renders has become more and more divided along economic 
lines: one higher class of justice only accessible to the rich, and a 
lesser one open to the poor. 
To demonstrate the depth of the justice gap and how impervious to 
improvement it has been over these twenty-five years, this Essay first 
compares the unmet legal needs of the poor then and now.  Next, this 
Essay considers the prodigious efforts exerted by the Chief Judges, 
the courts, and the organized Bar to improve the availability of legal 
services for the poor.  And then this Essay weighs that level of 
commitment against the still modest results that such unwavering and 
concentrated energies have produced. 
In 1988, the New York State Bar Association undertook a survey 
to measure the unmet needs for legal services experienced by poor 
people in New York State.16  The study, first released in 1990, 
documented the deeply troubling social and economic conditions 
under which low-income New Yorkers lived, and how the dire effects 
                                                                                                                                      
 16. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N COMM. ON LEGAL AID, THE NEW YORK LEGAL 
NEEDS STUDY (1993). 
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of those circumstances came to bear on our courts.  Among its most 
important contributions, the study documented the extensive 
incidence of poverty in New York and its pronounced manifestation 
in the justice system.17 
Specifically, according to the study, approximately three million 
people, or nearly 15% of the State’s 1987 population, lived on incomes 
at or below the national poverty level (based on an index that then 
stood at $11,700 per year for a family of four).18 The study also found 
that households representing the State’s poor population reported an 
average of 2.37 distinct civil legal problems—involving basic human 
needs such as housing, employment, health, and parental rights—for 
which the individuals had obtained no legal assistance during the 
survey year.19 At the same time, federal, State, and local funding 
available for civil legal services for the poor had experienced sharp 
reductions.  With all available public and private resources combined, 
only about 14% of the overall legal needs of the poor were being 
met.20 
Skip forward twenty-five years to the most recent examinations of 
the same conditions.  A new legal needs survey was performed in 
2010 by the Task Force to Expand Access to Civil Legal Services in 
New York State,21 a group of prominent leaders of the New York 
State Bar appointed by Chief Judge Lippman.  The Task Force was 
directed to measure the extent of the unmet civil legal services needs 
of the poor, to propose statewide priorities, programs, strategies, and 
best practices to improve the delivery of legal services in civil 
proceedings, and to advocate for greater public funding to finance 
legal services for the poor.  In its needs analysis, the Task Force found 
that among the working poor, defined as persons reporting incomes at 
or below 200% of the federal poverty index (then approximately 
$22,100 for a family of four), almost three million people had faced a 
civil legal problem also involving fundamental human needs during 
the study year.22  The Task Force’s report concluded that at most, 20% 
of the needs of the State’s working poor for civil legal services were 
being addressed.23 In concrete terms, these figures indicated that 
                                                                                                                                      
 17. See generally id. 
 18. Id. at 10. 
 19. Id. at 1. 
 20. Id. at 159–60. 
 21. See THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., 
supra note 3. 
 22. Id. at 4, 11. 
 23. Id. at 4. 
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every year more than 2.3 million low-income New Yorkers proceed 
through the State’s civil justice system without legal assistance.24  
Legal services providers confirm these figures.  The Legal Aid 
Society, for example, reported that in 2012 its offices turned away 
nearly 90% of people who sought legal assistance.25 
Thus, in nearly twenty-five years little changed in any of the major 
social and court system indicators that measure the justice gap.  The 
number of people in the state classified as poor, the number of civil 
legal problems low-income households encountered, and the number 
of persons involved in court proceedings who experienced a need for 
legal services but were unable to obtain assistance of counsel, 
remained substantially unchanged.  One telling statistic relevant to 
this overview, however, did register a dramatic rise: in 1987, 
approximately 110,000 attorneys were registered in New York State.26  
The number in 2012 was approximately 280,000.27 
Against these realities, no serious dispute could arise regarding 
three issues.  First, the vast unmet needs of poor people in New York 
for legal services pertaining to basic human needs still persist in crisis 
proportions.  Second, the primary obligation to resolve the justice gap 
and its impact on the legal system belongs to government at all levels.  
And third, to fulfill this purpose, public financing of legal services 
providers to employ trained, full-time lawyers is the most effective 
solution, and should be the first-line strategy for both government 
and the organized Bar to pursue.  I will not dwell further on these 
points except to note that the mere existence of the justice gap, with 
its long duration and overwhelming proportions, constitutes ample 
evidence of the continuing inadequacy of the governmental response, 
and of the dim prospects that change will emerge from that front 
anytime soon. 
What does constitute the subject of great debate within the legal 
community regarding the scope of justice gap presents a different 
question.  Assuming both the persistence of the enormous unmet 
need for legal services for the poor, the considered ongoing shortage 
of governmental resources, and the unpromising future for 
                                                                                                                                      
 24. See id. 
 25. John Caher, Hearing Begins Evaluation of Need for More Civil Legal 
Services, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 2013, www.legal-aid.org/en/mediaandpublicinformation/ 
inthenews/newyorklawjournalreportsonchiefjudgelippmanshearings.aspx. 
 26. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 10TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF 
ADMINISTRATOR 102 (1988). 
 27. E-mail from Sam Younger, Deputy Dir., N.Y. Office of Court Admin., to 
Hon. Victor Marrero, Senior Judge, S.D.N.Y. (June 25, 2013) (on file with author) 
(citing numbers from an internal report not published). 
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improvement on this score, what are individual members of the Bar 
now doing or not doing about these worsening conditions and their 
impacts on the justice system?  Should lawyers bear an obligation to 
do more? 
III.  THE FIRE NEXT DOOR: FROM LEGAL CRISIS TO MORAL 
CRISIS 
As a point of departure for a review of what exists and what 
remains to be done about the justice gap, recall the lofty exhortation 
enshrined in the New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional 
Responsibility.28  Preceding the text of Ethical Canon 2-34 is a 
statement that “a lawyer has a professional obligation to render 
public interest and pro bono legal service.”29  The pro bono 
contributions contemplated by this provision are defined broadly to 
include legal services at no fee and without expectation of a fee to: (1) 
persons of limited financial means; (2) not-for-profit, governmental or 
public services organizations, where the legal services are designed 
primarily to address the legal and other basic needs of persons of 
limited financial means; or (3) organizations specifically designed to 
increase the availability of legal services to persons of limited means.30  
As a numerical goal, the number of hours of pro bono and public 
interest legal service that each lawyer should aspire to provide was 
recently raised from twenty to fifty.31  To assess how well members of 
the Bar have fared over the past twenty-five years in achieving these 
ethical standards, I return to some important developments set in 
motion in 1988. 
A. The Picture Then 
In 1988, then-New York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler observed 
that the problems associated with the unmet needs of the State’s poor 
population for legal services had worsened.  In response, he noted 
that public attention had increasingly focused on the obligation of the 
private Bar to provide legal representation on behalf of people who 
                                                                                                                                      
 28. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, NEW YORK LAWYER’S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (2007), available at http://www.nysba.org//workarea/downloadasset. 
aspx?id=26638. 
 29. Id. at 23. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Joel Stashenko & Christine Simmons, Court System Enacts Disclosure 
Mandate for Pro Bono Service, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 2013, at 1, 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202598312375. 
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needed such services but were unable to afford them.32  To examine 
the issues he appointed the Committee to Improve the Availability of 
Legal Services (the CIALS).  The CIALS, which I had the honor and 
privilege to chair, was composed of leaders of the Bar drawn from 
every part of New York State.  As the Chief Judge spelled out, the 
CIALS’s mission was to develop a plan of action comprising 
programs and methods necessary to provide increased legal services 
to the poor by attorneys in New York through their involvement “in 
the discharge of their fundamental and ethical responsibilities as 
members of the Bar.”33  In particular, Chief Judge Wachtler’s charge 
provided, “Deliberations of the committee may also include 
consideration of the propriety and feasibility of imposing a mandatory 
pro bono obligation on all members of the bar . . . .”34 
The CIALS’s work spanned more than two years.  Its methods 
included consultations with legal services providers, bar associations, 
and law schools, as well as public hearings throughout the State 
designed to elicit views from members of the organized Bar and 
community leaders.  The CIALS then presented its Final Report to 
the Chief Judge in April 1990.35  In it, the CIALS made the following 
findings and recommendations: (1) the unmet need for civil legal 
services for the poor in New York constituted a critical problem 
having a devastating impact on the lives of large numbers of poor 
people who needed legal assistance and could not afford to pay for a 
lawyer; (2) the problem posed severe implications for the legitimacy 
of the State’s legal profession and justice system; (3) the problem had 
to be addressed promptly through the efforts of society in general and 
members of the legal profession; (4) whether or not society 
responded, lawyers have a separate professional responsibility to 
contribute meaningfully to remedy the problem; and (5) the scope of 
the need was so extensive that volunteer efforts alone could not 
provide an adequate response.36  The CIALS proposed a plan calling 
for obligatory pro bono legal services that it considered essentially 
sound and more responsive to the crisis than either the volunteerism 
alternative boosted by opponents, or inaction.37 
                                                                                                                                      
 32. See Marrero et al., supra note 7, app. A at 852. 
 33. Id. at 852. 
 34. Id. at 853. 
 35. Id. at 756. 
 36. Id. at 768. 
 37. See id. 
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1. A Plan of Action . . . 
The CIALS’s far-reaching pro bono services proposal 
recommended that the State court system adopt a rule that would 
obligate all practicing attorneys in New York, as a condition of 
remaining in good standing as members of the State’s bar, to perform 
a minimum of twenty hours every year of qualifying legal services.38  
As defined by the CIALS plan, qualifying services would include 
three primary categories: (1) professional services in civil matters 
rendered directly to persons who cannot afford to compensate 
counsel; (2) activities designed to improve the administration of 
justice and access to justice for poor persons; and (3) professional 
services to charitable, religious, civic, or educational organizations in 
matters related primarily to addressing the needs of poor persons.39 
A word about nomenclature.  This proposal is of course known in 
the vernacular as “mandatory pro bono,” a somewhat unfortunate 
misnomer.  Combined, the terms border on the linguistic absurd 
somewhere along the lines of oxymoron, epithet, and call to arms.  As 
such, the phrase must have been the branding brainchild of someone 
challenged in communications and marketing skills, or a stroke of 
genius of a rabid opponent of the idea.  Better articulated, what the 
concept really embodies is a fulfillment of pro bono legal service, a 
public interest requirement that attorneys must satisfy annually as a 
condition of remaining as members of the New York Bar in good 
standing, and thus fulfilling the duties and enjoying the rewards of the 
profession. 
2. . . . And Reaction 
Response to the CIALS’s pro bono obligation proposal was mixed.  
It was supported by the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York, the largest organized Bar group in the State, as well as by some 
of the leading legal services providers and advocates, among them the 
Legal Aid Society, Community Action for Legal Services, Volunteers 
for Legal Services, New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, and the 
Council of Law Associates.  The concept also received substantial 
editorial endorsement, including from The New York Times.40 It was 
                                                                                                                                      
 38. See id. (stating the proposed requirement as forty hours of qualifying pro 
bono legal services every two years). 
 39. Id. at 768–69. 
 40. See Kevin Sack, Chief Judge Presses Lawyers on Legal Work for the Poor, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/02/nyregion/chief-judge-
presses-lawyers-on-legal-work-for-the-poor.html. 
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opposed by the New York State Bar Association and several county 
bar associations. 
Among the critics’ most frequent objections, one merits mention 
here because it directly squares with the legal and moral issues which 
remain at the heart of the legal community’s continuing debate about 
the subject.  Opponents pointed out that the problems created by the 
unmet needs of the poor for legal services involved issues for which 
society as a whole bore the responsibility and which could be solved 
properly only through allocation of adequate public resources.41  
Accordingly, they further argued that it was unfair to single out 
lawyers to bear an obligation not imposed on any other licensed 
professions and that legal services contributions made by volunteers 
should not be compelled.42 
To these arguments, the response that CIALS members found 
most persuasive relied on constitutional and ethical concepts.  The 
right to assistance of counsel and the fair and effective administration 
of justice regardless of a person’s financial means are bedrock 
principles enshrined in our constitutional government, and, at least in 
spirit, are also reflected in the Lawyer’s Code of Professional 
Responsibility.  As officers of the court, attorneys solemnly take a 
professional oath to honor and support those basic tenets.  The 
ethical canon which provides for the lawyer’s professional obligation 
to render public interest and pro bono legal service does not refer to 
mere charity applicable to all persons in general, but to a form of duty 
particular to attorneys that stems from and is integral to their special 
public role in our society. 
Because of the solid constitutional and public interest 
underpinnings upon which legal services in our courts are grounded, 
the lawyer’s function is unique among licensed professions.  The 
success or failure of our justice system thus depends vitally on the 
effective performance of attorneys’ duties and on the level of their 
contributions to strengthen the administration of justice.  The 
Constitution does not confer that lofty societal status on any other 
profession.  It makes no reference to the services of doctors, teachers, 
or plumbers, for example.  Accordingly, legal services stand quite 
apart from those provided by many other professional endeavors, and 
rest on a higher public plane.  From this perspective, to equate an 
attorney’s obligation to provide pro bono assistance to the poor in 
furtherance of the fair and effective administration of justice with 
                                                                                                                                      
 41. See Steven Wechsler, Attorneys’ Attitudes Toward Mandatory Pro Bono, 41 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 909, 926 (1990). 
 42. See id. 
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work performed by other professionals is to devalue the meaning of 
the lawyer’s public interest function in our society. 
Chief Judge Wachtler, acknowledging the divisions within the Bar, 
accepted the CIALS Final Report but deferred consideration of the 
pro bono service proposal.43  Noting that the State Bar Association 
had committed to redouble its efforts to significantly increase the 
legal services available to the poor by means of a comprehensive 
program of voluntary actions, Chief Judge Wachtler agreed to allow 
the Bar leaders two years to demonstrate the results of those 
initiatives.44  But, he cautioned that if those efforts were not successful 
after the two-year period, he would seek implementation of the pro 
bono service condition recommended by the CIALS.45 
The State Bar Association then launched an ambitious statewide 
campaign to mobilize attorneys to increase the level of volunteer legal 
services provided to the poor, using the CIALS definition as a 
benchmark.  Its ambitious twenty-point program touched every 
corner of the legal community and included initiatives of education, 
exhortation, advertising, recognition, encouragement, training, and 
coordination of pro bono activities.  The Association published its 
report of these efforts in February 1994.46 
Meanwhile, to monitor the results of the State Bar Association’s 
program, Chief Judge Wachtler appointed a Pro Bono Review 
Committee and named Justin Vigdor (a past President of the New 
York State Bar Association) and myself to serve as co-chairs.  That 
committee conducted three annual surveys and presented its Final 
Report to Chief Judge Wachtler’s successor, Judith Kaye, in April 
1994.47 
3. Inaction: The Silent Majority 
The Pro Bono Review Committee’s findings were not encouraging.  
Over the three-year survey period, nearly half of the members of the 
New York Bar indicated that they did not engage in any activity 
                                                                                                                                      
 43. Sol Wachtler, Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono, Introduction, 19 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 739, 743 (1991). 
 44. Id. at 742–43. 
 45. Id. at 743. 
 46. THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE & THE DEP’T OF PRO BONO 
AFFAIRS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, NEW YORK EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE UNMET 
NEEDS OF THE STATE’S POOR, SEPTEMBER, 1991 TO DECEMBER, 1993 (1994). 
 47. VICTOR MARRERO ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRO BONO REVIEW 
COMMITTEE (1994). 
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providing pro bono legal services of any kind.48  The percentage of 
attorneys providing any amount of qualifying pro bono services to 
poor persons actually declined slightly over three years—from 39.8% 
of those surveyed in 1990 to 37.7% in 1992.49  Of respondents who did 
participate in such services, only 21% met the twenty-hour annual 
standard proposed by the CIALS.50  But the total number of hours of 
qualifying services provided individually by attorneys who did 
contribute increased on average from 36.5 hours in 1990 to 44.0 hours 
in 1992.51  Considering the State Bar Association’s ambitious 
commitment to raise volunteerism, the results were less than 
promising.  Only 10% of respondents reported participating in 
qualifying service for the first time in 1992, and only 3.6% indicated 
that their initial response followed the pro bono volunteer activities 
promoted by the organized Bar.52  Ninety percent of contributors 
reported that they had provided pro bono legal services in the past.53 
From these results, several reasonable inferences and implications 
follow.  First, assuming these statistics continue to hold today, the 
analysis suggests that approximately 75% to 80% of the members of 
the Bar fail to meet the goal of twenty hours of pro bono services 
relating to the unmet legal needs of the poor.  Second, essentially the 
same overall percentage of lawyers—the same minority of the whole 
Bar—has traditionally volunteered in response to the dire need of the 
poor for legal services and the related crisis in the justice system.  
And third, significantly, the contributions by those attorneys who do 
participate in pro bono and public interest service have not been 
static.  Apparently, those lawyers have increased their professional 
commitment, providing more pro bono assistance at the same time as 
the unmet needs of the poor for legal services grew and as the Chief 
Judges and Bar leaders sounded the clarion call seeking more 
volunteers to help. 
4. Keeping the Light Flickering 
To round out this historical sketch, a few more key events merit 
reference.  Viewed as a whole, these developments underscore the 
                                                                                                                                      
 48. Id. at 23; see also JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPPMAN, N.Y. STATE 
UNIFIED COURT SYS., THE FUTURE OF PRO BONO IN NEW YORK, VOL. TWO: REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PRO BONO CONVOCATIONS 5 (2004). 
 49. MARRERO ET AL., supra note 47, at 15. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 47. 
 53. Id. at 14, 15, 20, 24, 47. 
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same three points: that the State court system has been constantly 
mindful of the justice gap; that its high-level efforts to address the 
crisis have been continuous; and that the level of lawyers’ volunteer 
contributions of legal services has remained relatively unchanged, and 
has fallen far short of the amount necessary to narrow the justice gap 
in any meaningful way. 
In 1997, Chief Judge Kaye and the Administrative Board of the 
New York State Courts, responding to a proposal from the New York 
City Bar Association, adopted a Pro Bono Resolution urging 
attorneys to provide twenty hours of qualifying pro bono service 
annually as defined by the CIALS proposal and to contribute 
financial support for the work of organizations devoted to rendering 
legal services for the poor.54  Starting then, a copy of the Pro Bono 
Resolution was included with the registration forms that the state 
court system biennially sends to all attorneys admitted to practice in 
New York. 
In 2002, responding to an initiative of Chief Judge Kaye and Chief 
Administrative Judge Jonathan Lippman, the State’s Unified Court 
System conducted another survey of the amount of pro bono legal 
services members of the State Bar performed related to the legal 
needs of the poor.  The study, which used the twenty-hour-per-year 
goal the Administrative Board recommended in the 1997 Pro Bono 
Resolution, indicated that 46% of practicing attorneys provided some 
qualifying pro bono service while a majority—54%—made no pro 
bono contribution of any kind.55  Moreover, of the attorneys who 
contributed pro bono services, only about 27% performed more than 
the recommended twenty hours per year.56 In fact, the levels of 
participation by New York lawyers in pro bono activities had not 
changed dramatically from those recorded by the Pro Bono Review 
Committee ten years earlier, with one exception that reaffirmed the 
findings of the earlier survey: the portion of volunteer attorneys who 
did perform pro bono legal services and who satisfied the twenty-hour 
per year CIALS standard, roughly the same 20% to 25% of the Bar, 
continued to do so in approximately the same amounts of about forty-
one hours per year.57 
                                                                                                                                      
 54. See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., PRO BONO RESOLUTION OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE COURTS (1997), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/attorneys/probono/resolution.shtml. 
 55. KAYE & LIPPMAN, supra note 48, at 2. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 26 n. 54. 
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Two years later, New York’s Unified Court System organized four 
Pro Bono Convocations throughout the State.  This initiative 
reflected a continuation of Chief Judge Kaye’s efforts to promote 
greater awareness of the unmet needs of poor people for legal 
services.  The report and recommendations of the Convocations was 
published in January 2004.58  In brief, the Convocations, citing the 
unmet legal needs study of the New York State Bar Association as 
revised in 1993,59 made several general findings: (1) a need existed to 
increase pro bono services in New York State; (2) formal statewide 
programs to promote pro bono were necessary and desirable; (3) all 
stakeholders should be involved in such activities; (4) the judiciary 
should have a significant role, but local leadership, design, 
implementation, and control of the tasks were essential to achieve a 
comprehensive and workable program; and (5) pro bono services 
should be voluntary.60 
B. The Picture Now 
The preceding overview brings us to the present and leaves an 
open question to guide the inquiry as it proceeds.  Where does the 
level of pro bono legal services provided by attorneys in New York 
stand today in terms of both the overall level of lawyer participation 
and the average number of hours contributed by each member of the 
Bar?  The short answer to this question is that at this time, no hard 
measures exist more recently than in the twenty-year-old Pro Bono 
Review Committee surveys and the 2002 update prepared by the 
Unified Court System in connection with the 2004 Pro Bono 
Convocations. 
Several initiatives recently instituted by Chief Judge Lippman, 
however, may soon provide a means to obtain a fresh indicator of the 
New York Bar’s current pro bono participation.61  Those efforts were 
                                                                                                                                      
 58. See id. 
 59. See generally N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N COMM. ON LEGAL AID, THE LEGAL 
NEEDS STUDY (1993). 
 60. See KAYE & LIPPMAN, supra note 48, at 15. 
 61. Chief Judge Lippman, consistent with a recommendation by the Task Force 
2010 Report, obtained approval to increase from $12.5 million to $25 million the 
State judiciary’s funding for civil legal services for poor persons. See N.Y. STATE 
UNIFIED COURT SYS., BUDGET: GENERAL STATE CHARGES: FISCAL YEAR APRIL 1, 
2012–MARCH 31, 2013, at 132 (2011), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ 
admin/financialops/BGT12-13/Final-GSC-Budget_2012-13.pdf.  Other activities that 
the Chief Judge and the State court system carried out for these purposes included: 
the Attorney Emeritus Program, which seeks to encourage retired attorneys in good 
standing to provide, through qualified legal services organizations, at least thirty 
hours of services as pro bono counsel to low-income clients, see Jonathan Lippman, 
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designed to narrow the justice gap by raising both public funding to 
legal services organizations and the level of volunteer pro bono 
contributions by members of the Bar.   Among them, two are most 
significant for the purposes of this subject.  One is the adoption of a 
rule requiring law school graduates to complete fifty hours of 
participation in qualifying law-related pro bono work as a condition 
of admission to law practice in New York.62  The second entails a 
mandatory reporting requirement by which attorneys will indicate on 
their biennial registration forms the number of hours of pro bono 
legal services they provided during the preceding two years related to 
the legal services needs of the poor.63 
1. A New Benchmark 
The pro bono reporting rule went into effect in May 2013 and has 
particular relevance to this discussion.64  The results from the first 
evaluation of the reporting requirement could make available useful 
updated information about how many, and in what amount, New 
York attorneys are honoring their ethical obligation to provide pro 
bono and public interest legal service.  The shame or guilt, and 
perhaps even a do-good inducement, associated with this requirement 
could also potentially create a new incentive for lawyers who are not 
making any pro bono contributions to do so for mandatory reporting 
purposes.  I anticipate that when the numbers are disclosed, an 
important public debate will ensue about their meaning and 
implications.  In that respect, essential questions and concerns, as well 
as pitfalls, will arise that any new review should address.  Here I 
suggest some of the major issues that those discussions should 
consider, and a framework for analysis of the underlying issues. 
I pause at this point to express a disclaimer followed by a word of 
caution.  I do not wish to prejudge the outcomes that the pro bono 
reporting requirement may produce, nor do I want to appear unduly 
                                                                                                                                      
New Attorney Emeritus Program is Announced, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25, 2010, 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202439358963/-New-Attorney-Emeritus-
Program-Is-Announced; the appointment of a committee to study the feasibility of 
permitting non-lawyers to provide assistance to the poor in simple civil matters, see 
Joel Stashenko, Non-Lawyers May Get Role in Closing New York’s “Justice Gap,” 
N.Y. L.J., May 30, 2013, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202601857889; and 
an increase from twenty to fifty hours in the annual pro bono legal services goal 
applicable to all Bar members, see Stashenko & Simmons, supra note 31. 
 62. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.16 (2013). 
 63. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 118(e)(14) (2013). 
 64. See Pro Bono Reporting Requirements—Attorney Registration, N.Y. 
COURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/attorneys/probono/reportingreqs-intro.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
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skeptical of what the numbers will reveal about New York lawyers’ 
responses to any new pro bono services survey based on that 
mandate.  But, there are indicators that could offer predictions of 
what the results might show.  In some of the states in which the court 
system imposed such a reporting requirement, lawyers’ declarations 
indicated an increase in the total amount of pro bono activities.  In 
Illinois, for example, as Chief Judge Lippman’s Task Force 2010 
Report points out,65 the pro bono hours lawyers reported rose by 
about 10% after the rule went into effect.  Nonetheless, before Bar 
and court officials draw any hard conclusion from the reports or 
formulate an official policy response, they should carefully analyze 
and consider the reports’ statistical significance. 
2. Amber Light 
At the risk of sounding too much like a spoilsport—the Grinch who 
stole New York lawyers’ pro bono reporting celebration before it 
happened—I will play a dual role at this juncture: as devil’s advocate 
and as prophet.  For the purposes of the first part, I will assume that 
the most encouraging results emerge from a new survey of voluntary 
pro bono contribution by New York lawyers, that the reporting 
requirement will demonstrate a rise in participation of say 10% or 
even 20%.  As heartening as such numbers might appear at first 
glance, the outcome would still raise issues that merit closer scrutiny 
and counsel amber light precaution.  In this regard, the weightiest risk 
we must guard against is the rush to judgment, the temptation to 
celebrate statistics prematurely and, regarding ongoing pro bono 
efforts, deciding that even a modest improvement is good enough. 
Here I will switch professional garb from devil’s advocate and don 
the robe of fortuneteller.  I would venture a prediction that in the 
debate about what the reporting requirement results indicate there 
will be a contingent, possibly comprising a substantial proportion of 
the members of the Bar, who, if the results show some increase in pro 
bono activities, will reject the cautionary approach I propose.  
Instead, buoyed and relieved by the numbers, their likely impulse will 
be euphoria—grounds to advocate for an immediate official 
pronouncement that the outcome is acceptable, so as to enable the 
New York Bar to declare victory and go home.  But, however 
exhilarated lawyers may feel by any such exciting early returns, 
another side in that debate should be heard, and forthrightly weighed.  
                                                                                                                                      
 65. See generally THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. 
IN N.Y., supra note 3. 
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I would again advise against hasty retreat from a future course aimed 
at expanding contributions of pro bono legal services universally and 
apportioning more equitably the Bar members’ unique responsibility 
in efforts aimed at closing the justice gap and relieving the crisis in 
our courts.  Before jumping to conclusions regarding the meaning of 
lawyers’ reports about their pro bono contributions, the legal 
community should ensure that we possess a sufficiently reliable 
analytic framework to support any policy response.  What the 
circumstances may demand and justify as a proper next step for the 
court system to follow should be both principled and based on 
defensible data. 
In line with my continuing role here as constructive critic, I suggest 
several fundamental issues that a thorough examination of the 
reporting requirement results should consider.  At the outset, it is 
important to bear in mind that the reporting system incorporates 
several built-in limitations that could produce substantial 
overstatement of pro bono legal services.  It employs self-reports.  For 
that reason alone, such representations should be accorded 
heightened scrutiny.66  Indeed, judges regularly admonish juries 
                                                                                                                                      
 66. The use of self-reports as sources of data for empirical research and 
administrative purposes suffers from obvious shortcomings.  In scientific studies that 
rely heavily on investigation based on self-report questionnaires, researchers 
customarily acknowledge the obvious limitations of results produced by the method. 
See generally Rob Hoskin, The Dangers of Self-Report, SCI. FOR ALL BRAINWAVES 
(Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.sciencebrainwaves.com/uncategorized/the-dangers-of-self-
report.  The tendency of respondents to exaggerate or minimize answers because of 
personal biases, fear of public embarrassment or incrimination, and/or the influence 
of other self-interests, works to diminish the accuracy and reliability of information 
gathered by self-reports. 
  The federal income tax system provides an instructive example of the 
substantial rate of error self-reporting procedures generate, even in connection with a 
mandatory public obligation subject to enforcement through severe penalties.  For 
2006, the most recent year for which public records are available, the Internal 
Revenue Service reported a gross tax gap (the difference between taxes owed and 
taxes paid on time) of $450 billion, of which approximately 84% represented under-
reported tax liability. See James M. Bickley, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42739, TAX 
GAP, TAX COMPLIANCE, AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 1–2 
(2012).  Of the portion of income under-reported, 56% was attributable to taxpayers 
who directly reported in their tax returns various sources of income not subject to 
withholding, in contrast to only 1% in relation to income reported by employers to 
the IRS from which taxes were withheld.  In 2012, the random audits of individual 
returns that the IRS performed resulted in no change in tax liability in 10% of 
examinations conducted in person and no change in 15% of those done by mail.  
Presumably, therefore, the IRS found under-reporting and imposed additional tax 
liability on a significant number of audited returns. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 55B, DATA 
BOOK 2012, at 23 (2012).  Finally, in the criminal investigations the IRS conducted for 
tax reporting violations, the resulting rate of conviction was 93%. See IRS 
OVERSIGHT BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2012, at 36, 40 (2013). 
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weighing potentially self-serving testimony of interested witnesses. 
Caution is indicated here for numerous other reasons.  The responses 
are not confidential and would be measured against a defined goal of 
voluntary activities.  No audits or sanctions follow up on the reports, 
and no consequences flow from failure to satisfy the new fifty-hour 
aspirational standard.  Thus, no means exist to check the filing of false 
or exaggerated information.  Because the identity of the reporting 
attorneys would be shown in the registration forms, and potentially 
subject to public disclosure, lawyers’ awareness that a name is linked 
to the disclosure, combined with the other considerations described 
above, could induce substantially enhanced reports. 
On the other hand, if any new survey of pro bono activities bears 
relation to reality and reflects previous patterns, another outcome, 
one consistent with a vital component of the level of pro bono legal 
services measured in the prior surveys, is likely to recur.  Any real 
bump recorded in the total amount of pro bono contributions 
attorneys report is likely to derive disproportionately from the same 
minority of New York Bar members who traditionally have 
participated in pro bono activities.  In view of these shortcomings, 
assessment of the reporting requirement should factor in a reliable 
margin of error.  This measure would recognize that under these 
circumstances the amount of pro bono services lawyers report 
represents not hard truth, but an approximation, and thus that proper 
adjustment should be made in the analysis so that the recognized 
results project not a flawed representation, but the closest possible 
embodiment of reality. 
A second line for further examination in this endeavor should 
consider both the starting point for measurement and the prevailing 
conditions against which progress should be evaluated.  Stated 
another way, any appraisal of impacts and effectiveness of the levels 
of individual and total pro bono activities that lawyers report should 
be examined in relation to the scope of current total legal services 
needs and the remedial impacts all existing resources are now making.  
To aid this review, several questions merit consideration.  Assuming 
the reports indicate some rise in the amount of pro bono services 
attorneys are contributing, what is the proper baseline?  How many 
and which lawyers are doing how much?  What does any incremental 
rise in the level of pro bono participation actually mean to the unmet 
needs of the poor and to the courts?  In other words, does any higher 
amount of reported pro bono services translate into material 
improvement of conditions on the ground, in the courts, and in the 
overall dimensions of the justice gap?  Or, given the magnitude and 
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gravity of prevailing conditions, would any such increase still make 
only a nominal difference in the grand scheme of things? 
Returning to my Cassandra role, I now elaborate on, and warn 
against, what I perceive as a prospect very likely to flow from the 
initial results of the pro bono reporting requirement, and why 
cautious examination of them matters so much.  This forecast is based 
on responses to reports of prior efforts to measure lawyers’ pro bono 
participation levels, specifically the pro bono activities reported in the 
surveys conducted by the Pro Bono Review Committee from 1990 to 
1992 and by the Unified Court System in 2002.  Recall the most 
salient findings suggested by those studies.  To the extent members of 
the New York Bar provided pro bono or public interest legal services, 
their overall response derived from less than 50% of the lawyers, and 
not more than about 25% of them satisfied the annual twenty-hour 
minimum suggested by the CIALS in 1990 and the 1997 Pro Bono 
Resolution.67 The balance, over 50% of Bar members, performed 
either less than the aspirational goal or no pro bono or public interest 
legal services at all.  In essence, for many of the non-participating 
attorneys, the moral obligation for which the language of the 
Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility’s EC 2-34 strives may 
as well be, to use common legal jargon, supernumerary surplusage 
signifying nothing about which Bar members should be seriously 
concerned. 
Yet, in response to reports of the results of the previous pro bono 
surveys it is not uncommon to find members of the organized Bar 
focusing their attention on the rise in the total amount of legal 
services provided collectively by all attorneys and touting the higher 
average number of hours per year individual attorneys contributed.  
That response ignores two important points: that on closer analysis, as 
a percentage of the whole the number of attorneys contributing pro 
bono did not change, and that the increase in the number of hours 
reported was largely attributable to the same participating minority. 
3. Sooner Action and Why It Matters 
In response to the challenge and the course my admonitions 
suggest, some representatives of the silent majority probably would 
react aggressively.  They might declare: so what?  And they would 
remind us that nothing in the law says that they are under any binding 
obligation to do anything about the justice gap.  True enough.  So why 
should their absence from the pro bono honor rolls matter?  To 
                                                                                                                                      
 67. See generally N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., supra note 54. 
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whom should it make a difference that a substantial majority of the 
members of the Bar remains on the sidelines while a legal crisis 
continues to diminish our justice system and while the entire weight 
of efforts to relieve the shortfall continues to land on essentially the 
same relatively small proportion of New York lawyers? 
I would go further and pose perhaps the most provocative question 
this line of inquiry suggests.  Assume that the larger society, 
expressing itself through official budgetary and political policies, 
chooses to disregard the justice system’s pleas for adequate resources 
and also ignores warnings of the consequences, and continues to 
shortchange legal services, producing an ever wider and deeper 
justice gap.  When that event comes to pass—as in fact it has in New 
York, as reflected by the unmet legal services needs of the poor in our 
courts during at least the past twenty-five years—why should a larger 
share of responsibility and a greater contribution for remedying the 
accompanying problems not be demanded of all lawyers admitted to 
practice in New York?  Why should a more rigorous obligation for 
safeguarding the fundamental ethical and legal values of fairness and 
equal access to justice not be imposed on all members of the Bar by 
the authorized court administrators? 
A comparable line of inquiry would apply, and indeed its moral 
crossroad has been encountered, in other contexts.  Suppose jury 
service, or paying taxes, or military service in time of war, were 
voluntary and, even as vital public functions and societal structures 
began to break down, not more than 25% of the citizenry, drawn 
disproportionately from the same social or economic ranks, chose to 
honor their moral obligation and participate fully in official calls for 
contributions?  Would a rule requiring universal participation not be 
justified? 
Admittedly, under the existing law, there is no legal answer to 
these questions. In Turner v. Rogers,68 the Supreme Court recently 
declined to rule that a constitutional right exists under the Due 
Process Clause to compel court appointment of counsel in civil cases 
for litigants who cannot afford a lawyer, even in a contempt 
proceeding in which the offender faces a penalty of imprisonment.  
And, of course, the provisions of the Lawyer’s Code of Professional 
Responsibility EC 2-34 represent merely aspirational goals.  At this 
time, the Bar’s efforts to generate a more effective answer to the 
questions raised here must depend largely on two recourses.  One is 
to wait for a major change in existing law, potentially adopted by 
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decision of the United States Supreme Court or the New York Court 
of Appeals, or by State statute or amendment of the canons of ethics, 
to make the pro bono service standard prescribed by EC 2-34 
obligatory at least in some circumstances.  A second approach is for 
the courts and the organized Bar to continue on the present course.  
To that end they would continue to press for the miracle of a stronger 
voluntary pro bono response by lawyers, self-motivated and 
emanating from moral grounds, unsatisfactory as the Bar’s pro bono 
performance record has been to date in relying primarily on the force 
generated by this domain. 
Despite the broad reach of the challenge I pose, I consider myself a 
realist.  I recognize that, regrettably, at this time efforts to produce a 
more effective answer by the legislature, the courts, and the Bar to 
the questions I raise are likely to be long term.  That prospect creates 
a period of continuing uncertainty, one of those long pauses that 
induce doubt.  Like a moment evoking a sense of waiting for Godot, it 
asks: what happens in the meantime? 
4. Fighting the Fire 
What I see likely to happen next is that, absent a more effective 
and more immediate response from the court system, the justice gap 
and its attendant moral crisis will continue getting worse.  To 
demonstrate my prediction, I turn again to the instructive aid of 
another allegorical tale—as promised, one closer to the home front. 
The courthouse is on fire, presenting a major crisis for the judges, 
the lawyers, the litigants, and the administration of justice in the 
State.  The magnitude of the problem is staggering.  The building is 
far too big, the fire too extensive, and the potential loss of lives and 
property too great for the firefighters available.  The existing force 
can provide only a fraction of the vast resources needed to handle the 
emergency effectively.  To save the historic structure, the fire 
commissioner asks the court system for help in mobilizing volunteers.  
The Chief Judge declares an emergency and puts out a call urging all 
lawyers to lend a hand.  A substantial number, say nearly 50%, 
promptly respond with contributions in varying amounts varyingly 
helpful to the rescue efforts.  Some assist the firefighters in pulling the 
hoses.  Some join in relay teams passing buckets of water.  Some send 
money to aid the victims and help pay for restoration of the building. 
As the threat intensifies, the Chief Judge seeks to fill the dire 
shortage of resources by drafting law students and enlisting voluntary 
support from retired lawyers and members of the general public.  
These recruits are asked to perform non-hazardous but nonetheless 
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important remedial tasks.  Meanwhile, a substantial majority of the 
members of the Bar, though sworn as officers of the court and by 
virtue of the profession’s ethical canons morally bound to help, ignore 
the crisis and pay no heed to the Chief Judge’s entreaties.  In fact they 
do nothing.  Even as the flames spread and engulf the courthouse and 
imperil the integrity of the profession, they watch in silence, hands in 
their pockets, pails of water idle at their feet.  When they do open 
their mouths to speak, it is merely to remind the Chief Judge that, 
unfortunate as the reality may seem, extinguishing the fire and 
repairing the courthouse are not the problems of lawyers alone, but 
rather public responsibilities the government should impose on the 
whole society.  The Chief Judge, as guardian of cherished values the 
justice system proclaims and as keeper of the ethical standards 
governing the Bar, possesses authority to act decisively in this 
emergency.  How should the Chief Judge respond? 
This vignette represents an expression of how I, and possibly other 
members of the CIALS, perceived the legal and moral crises 
confronting New York’s justice system and the members of the Bar 
twenty-five years ago when Chief Judge Wachtler charged our 
committee to examine the problem.  As it relates to legal services for 
the poor, the ethical dilemma the tale poses should not be hard to 
recognize.  In any candid picture of our justice system, the story 
captures substantially how the threat occasioned by the justice gap 
and the corresponding challenge appeared then, and how the same 
conditions still appear today. 
The hypothetical also reveals a paradox.  The moral crisis created 
by the unmet legal services needs of the poor intensifies in direct 
relation to introduction of less desirable remedies while more 
effective means to address the demand are available but withheld or 
exempt from deployment.  The ethical complications become more 
profound as long as a substantial portion of the Bar disregards or 
tolerates urgent conditions in the justice system, leaving harms 
unremedied while the severity of the underlying emergency continues 
to worsen.69 
Specifically, in evaluating the moral implications associated with 
the unmet legal services needs, several considerations bear decisive 
weight.  First, the same relatively small percentage of volunteer 
attorneys, a minority of all the members of the Bar, not only 
continues to shoulder the entire burden of the private Bar’s response, 
but is constantly called upon to contribute even more.  Second, the 
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court system’s efforts to address the problem forces it to resort, as it 
has in New York and elsewhere, to the aid of clearly valuable but not 
optimal alternative resources, such as retired lawyers, students, and 
general public volunteers. 
Third, meanwhile, a vast multitude of lawyers who possess the 
requisite training, experience, and resources—and whose 
contributions would enable the court system to make a truly 
substantial difference in alleviating the crisis—remain unresponsive 
on the sidelines, protesting stronger calls for their assistance, and 
disclaiming responsibility for contributing anything to help.  Fourth, 
these holdouts, by virtue of the license the State grants them to 
practice law, are empowered to serve as officers of the court, and also 
are enabled to earn a decent living and enjoy high social standing in 
their communities.  These lawyers would do well to recognize that a 
scorched courthouse represents a moral failure that ultimately leaves 
them a lesser place in which to ply their trade, and that their inaction 
contributes to generating a justice system whose legitimacy is 
threatened and a profession whose stature is correspondingly 
diminished. 
5. The Most Fundamental Issue 
As I perceive it, the moral crisis I describe has worsened because 
something else—a weight that tipped the balance—decidedly 
changed.  At some grade of severity, the combination of these 
increasingly urgent and unremedied circumstances sets in motion on a 
larger scale a variable that underpins the most vital of moral 
questions: fundamental fairness.  In the existing state of play, the 
unchanging or rising magnitude of the unmet needs of the poor for 
legal assistance in proceedings involving basic human needs creates 
fundamental unfairness of different kinds in several spheres, 
especially when combined with the heavily disproportionate 
contributions to remedial efforts by members of the Bar.  There is 
unfairness to poor people.  This effect is palpably destructive of 
individual lives and of the court system, grounded as it is on the 
unrelieved hardships and injustices poor people suffer daily during 
imbalanced adversarial judicial proceedings that essentially pit them 
against opponents commanding grossly unmatched legal resources. 
Fundamental unfairness also implicates the members of the Bar.  It 
is manifested by the uneven performance of lawyers in fulfilling their 
ethical obligation to provide pro bono and public interest legal 
service.  Those who contribute nothing, the silent majority missing in 
action, create an unfairly heavier burden of participation which the 
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rest are called upon to bear.  This inequality takes on larger 
dimension because it could reach a point at which the disproportion 
yields deep, counterproductive resentment among those who are left 
to carry the brunt of the weight indefinitely.  That circumstance could 
arise, for instance, in the case of the pro bono contribution required 
of law students to fulfill the highest ideals of the profession as a 
condition for admission to the Bar.  When they become practitioners, 
could these young lawyers help but observe that no such obligation 
applies to all members of the Bar, and that in fact the silent majority 
of lawyers continues to contribute nothing to help narrow the justice 
gap?  The inherent unfairness some of those newly admitted 
attorneys may perceive in that inequality could engender cynicism 
that in turn may impede their further contribution of pro bono and 
public interest legal service. 
Finally, fairness issues stemming from the unmet legal services 
needs of the poor permeate throughout other interests encompassed 
by the justice system—the parties in court proceedings, the lawyers, 
the courts, and the larger society.  Judicial proceedings involving 
unrepresented litigants impose heavier burdens on all participants.  
Those parties face inherently more demanding challenges.   They tend 
to be disproportionately less educated, less informed, and often less 
able to speak or understand English well enough to present a 
sufficient case.  For these reasons, lawyers appearing against 
unrepresented litigants in some cases could easily take advantage of 
their ignorance of the law to induce them into an unfavorable 
disposition.  Cases involving unrepresented parties are not only more 
difficult to adjudicate on the merits, but also to settle, thus prolonging 
uncertainty and enlarging costs for other litigants.  Largely by reason 
of their lack of familiarity with the law, some unrepresented litigants 
tend to adopt hard, unrealistic positions that advice of counsel can 
usually soften.  The judges’ role as impartial arbiters is often strained 
in these actions.  In efforts to maintain a modicum of balance and 
fairness in what are innately lopsided proceedings, the judges are 
called upon to grapple with unique challenges.  They have to walk the 
fine line between preventing injustice to unrepresented parties by 
explaining legal principles and offering subtle guidance to them, while 
also preserving a proper level of neutrality. 
6. Synthesis 
How do the multiple issues and considerations I have outlined tie 
together, and what logical, legal, and moral implications emerge from 
them?  Twenty-five years ago, when the CIALS reached such a point 
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of synthesis, it reached the conclusion I described above.  It noted 
that an official response to the legal services crisis based primarily on 
voluntary efforts generated by the organized Bar would be far too 
limited, unreliable, short-term, and unfair—and thus morally 
unacceptable—to respond adequately to the unmet legal services 
needs of the poor, particularly in court proceedings involving basic 
human needs.  The CIALS therefore recommended that the state 
court system impose a pro bono legal service obligation as a condition 
for lawyers to remain in good standing as members of the Bar.70 
In those days, when I reached this point in talking to some 
gatherings of lawyers, I would sense the energy fields in the 
auditorium begin to crackle and spark, and the room temperature to 
rise.  These atmospheric disturbances usually served as the cues for 
some in the audience, at least in a figurative sense, to take to the 
streets, to uproot the cobblestones and brandish pitchforks, to erect 
barriers, shout catcalls, and throw tomatoes.  Because in my 
assessment of prevailing circumstances I have detected little change in 
some of the most vital forces that shape this debate, I hope that at 
least in this audience the passage of time has mellowed those 
passions.  I hope also that another look at the conditions 
unrepresented poor people experience in our courts today will enable 
the Bar as a whole to view the facts on the ground with an open mind, 
due composure, and greater balance. 
CONCLUSION 
However the concept is labeled, the pro bono legal service 
condition that the CIALS developed twenty-five years ago still exists 
out there in suspense, and every bit as pertinent and valid today as it 
was then.  It remains a weighty option with immense potential to 
make a significant difference in narrowing the justice gap.  Yet, like 
the elephant hiding in the living room, it represents a large presence 
many lawyers do not wish to confront or even contemplate.  
Nonetheless, my crystal ball tells me that a time could come when 
circumstances will render it inevitable for the court system to adopt, 
as the CIALS proposed, a pro bono legal service condition applicable 
to all attorneys registered in the State.  That move might be impelled 
by a potential combination of several circumstances on a larger scale 
to establish the necessary foundation for a bold response by the court 
system.  Those conditions include: the continued widening of the 
justice gap; the resulting imbalances and greater unfairness that 
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characterize lawyers’ disproportionate voluntary contributions; and 
the worsening moral crisis these conditions present as they further 
weaken our justice system and the legal profession. 
The moment I forecast could arise, for example, should the United 
States Supreme Court, or the New York Court of Appeals, discarding 
the rule of Turner, recognize the existence of a right to representation 
of counsel, a civil Gideon, in cases involving basic human needs, such 
as court proceedings threatening a party with loss of liberty, home, 
food benefits, or parental rights.  This prospect is not a pipe dream.  
Two observations also recently noted by New York Chief Judge 
Lippman71 support its plausibility. 
First, only twenty-one years separated Gideon and the decision it 
overruled, Betts v. Brady.72  During that interval, the legal 
community’s efforts, public and private, mobilized support at the 
State and local levels, to provide counsel to indigent defendants, and 
to prepare the groundwork for the law to evolve empirically and 
conceptually enough to compel the rule of Gideon.  Second, through 
current legal scholarship,73 as well as through litigation and policy 
advocacy, comparable access to justice initiatives are already building 
momentum in some states toward recognition of a civil Gideon.74  In a 
resolution adopted in 2006, the American Bar Association called for 
governments to provide resources to support recognition of a right to 
assistance of counsel in civil proceedings involving basic human 
needs.75  Similarly, the Conference of State Chief Justices and the 
Conference of State Court Administrators urged their members in 
2008 to exert leadership to prevent denials of access to justice.76 
But until these efforts eventually produce the outcome wished for, 
the immense and long-standing unmet demand for civil legal services 
for the poor will continue to impair the fair and effective 
administration of justice in our courts.  In the interim, to mitigate the 
crisis, adoption of a pro bono legal service condition for admission to 
practice law in New York will become all the more compelling.  
Gatherings of interested and concerned audiences, pressing for more 
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immediate change, can help ensure that the concept of a pro bono 
service condition, such as the one the CIALS proposed twenty-five 
years ago, stays relevant in the debate as an available option. 
